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Abstract. To foster the secure use of telematic services provided by
public institutions, most European countries – and others in the rest of
the world – are promoting electronic identification systems among their
citizens to enable fully reliable identification. However, in today’s global-
ized environment, it is becoming more common for citizens and entities
of a given country, with their own electronic credentials under the legal
framework of their country, to seek access to the public services pro-
vided by other countries with different legal frameworks and credentials.
At present, a number of projects in the European Union are attempting
to solve the problem through the use of pan-European identity manage-
ment systems that ensure interoperability between the public institutions
of different Member States. However, the solutions adopted to date are
inadequate, for they do not envision all possible cases of user interac-
tion with institutions. Specifically, they fail to address a very important
aspect provided in different national legal systems, namely delegation
of identity, by which a citizen can authorize another to act on his or
her behalf in accessing certain services provided by public institutions.
This paper provides a thorough analysis of problems of delegation and
proposes an architecture based on X.509 Proxy Certificates and SAML
assertions to enable delegation in provision of services in the complex
and heterogeneous environment presented by the public institutions of
the European Union as a whole.
Keywords: Identity delegation, Proxy Certificates, SAML, X.509, eID,
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1 Introduction
In the development of the information society, public authorities are playing an
important role by promoting the implementation of new e-government services to
enable citizens to perform administrative transactions quickly and easily. Given
that dealings between citizens and the government are often of a strictly personal
nature, there is now a growing demand for electronic or digital identity systems
to unequivocally identify people on the Internet.
In recent years, initiatives are under way in all Member States of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), for the introduction of electronic identities (eID) in public
services for the adoption of systems to manage them. In most EU countries,
the electronic identity systems implemented are based on the use of electronic
identification cards, also called eID cards, which are beginning to take the place
of the identity cards now used in some countries. These cards include a chip that
can both store citizens’ identity information and interact with certain validation
applications.
Although the introduction of a digital identity solves the principal problem
of remote authentication of citizens, this solution is not sufficient on its own
to achieve equivalence between administrative acts executed with traditional
methods with those that can be undertaken by electronic methods, as there
are other problems related to the different legal frameworks and different ways
identity is used in each country. Of these problems, the most significant and most
relevant one, owing both to its complexity and the fact that it is in demand
from the public, is identity delegation. In fact present law in many Member
States of the EU allows for delegation to another party in dealings with public
institutions: for example, a citizen can delegate to a specialized service provider
all interactions with the public institutions necessary in order to pay taxes.
However, the present problem of identity delegation in the public adminis-
tration has hardly been addressed in scientific literature, perhaps owing to the
more immediate need to deploy identity management systems in each country.
Once this first phase of deployment has been completed, it is time to consider
solutions that enable solving this problem not only at a national level, but a
solution that is scalable for use in the complex and heterogeneous environment
presented by the public institutions of the European Union as a whole. In Eu-
rope, circumstance occurs that although a citizen’s electronic identity allows for
operations within the system of one’s own country, this is not the case when that
system becomes that made up of all the countries of the European Union. Even
though a German citizen traveling in Belgium can present his or her German
identity card to prove their identity in dealings with the Belgian authorities,
they cannot do the same thing with electronic identity, as the electronic identity
and identity management systems in the two countries are not compatible.
Hence one of the central problems in the use of a digital identity is interoper-
ability between identity systems at a pan-European level. Generically, owing to
the diversity of identity management systems, when the user of a given system –
whether a citizen, an enterprise or the government itself – seeks to communicate
with governments outside the scope of his or her own local identity management
system, management systems must be linked to each other and understand each
other so that the identity of the user of one system can be understood and
accepted by the other system.
This paper offers solutions to the problem of identity delegation, thus allowing
citizens and entities to delegate to another person or entity certain interactions
with public institutions. First, it provides a complete solution to the problem of
identity delegation at national level, then, being based on the present state of
affairs in identity management systems at a pan-European level, where agree-
ment in principle exists, proposing a model for interoperability between identity
systems at a pan-European level that includes delegation. This will show the
scalability and applicability of the model presented for communications with
identity delegation among citizens and institutions from different EU countries.
The paper also discusses the pilot project in progress for implementing the so-
lution.
2 Digital Identity and Delegation of Digital Identity
The concept of digital identity or network identity, as it is called by the Lib-
erty Alliance [1] has emerged from users’ interaction with services offered on the
Internet. When users interact with these services, they often personalize them
according to their own preferences or needs: apart from establishing data access
control such as user and password, they will define other parameters such as, for
example, the information they wish to see displayed, the arrangement of items
on the page offering the service or a method for notifying changes in the service.
Users normally establish an account and personalize it for each of the service
providers to which they accede. Thus, a given user will have multiple accounts
with multiple parameters. According to the Liberty Alliance, the Network Iden-
tity of a user is the total sum of attribute sets of all a user’s accounts.
Specifically, the draft Liberty ID-FF Architecture Overview [2] defines net-
work identity as the global set of attributes composed from a user’s account(s).
For any given identity, there are usually several digital identities that may be
unique or not. A digital identity is, by definition, a subset of identity and can
be considered the manifestation of identity on the Internet.
The concept of identity delegation is defined by the Modinis IDM Study
Team [3] as the process in which an identified entity issues a mandate to an-
other identified entity. On the basis of this definition, we can see that the act of
delegating is a cession by a person or entity of part of its rights to another in
order to enable the latter to act on behalf of the former before a third party. In
terms of citizens and public institutions, delegation basically involves one citizen
granting another citizen authorization or a mandate that the latter can use, in
the name of the former, to access services provided by institutions.
Academic literature offers several examples of systems of delegation conceived
for different purposes and using different technologies. Notable among these tech-
nologies for their affinity to our purpose in this paper, are those presented in
Komura et al. [4], Alrodhan et al. [5], Gomi et al. [6] and Welch et al. [7].
According to Peeters et al. [8] at least three parties are involved in the process
of delegation: the delegator, the delegatee and the service provider. The delegator
is a person or entity that shares, by means of what is usually called a delegation
assertion, one or more of its privileges in accessing a service with another person
or entity. The delegatee is the person who receives the privileges of the delegator,
that is, the delegation assertion, and the service provider is the party which, as its
own name indicates, provides certain services on demand to the delegatee after
the delegation assertion has been presented. In addition to these generic entities,
and depending on the delegation process used, other entities may emerge, such
as the identity provider or delegation authorities.
Taking this set of basic entities as a point of departure, Alrodhan et al. [5]
presents a classification of delegation in two elementary models: the model of
direct delegation and the model of indirect delegation. Direct delegation is when
the delegator delegates all or a subset of his or her privileges to the delegatee,
who makes use of them to access a service. The same process applies in indirect
delegation, but through a series of intermediate delegatees.
We would highlight a series of aspects of delegation that were mentioned in
Alrodhan et al. [5]. The first is that delegation does not mean authorization.
That is, even if a service provider accepts the delegation, it need not accept the
privileges requested by the delegatee. It is always at the discretion of the service
provider whether or not to accept the request made by the delegatee. Secondly,
the delegation assertion must always prove consent on the part of the delegator,
as the latter may impose certain conditions on the act of delegation such as a
period of validity or permission to engage in indirect delegation. Finally, any
solution must always seek to preserve the privacy of the delegator.
3 Proxy Certificates, SAML and their Integration
As shown in the preceding section, a number of options for handling identity
information are available (SAML, I-Card, etc.), each with its own benefits and
drawbacks. However, the range of alternatives narrows if we wish to enable dy-
namic identity delegation and attribute-based restrictions. The authors have
opted for the following features:
1. Use of Proxy Certificates, owing mainly to their ease of integration in present
identity processes in European countries – most use public key certificates
for authenticating users – and their possibilities for dynamic generation and
2. Use of SAML assertions with attribute statements for the transport of user
attributes because this is the dominant trend in standardization and use.
We shall now discuss these technologies and how they can be integrate.
3.1 X.509 Proxy Certificates
X.509 Proxy Certificates [9] emerged as a result of certain needs that were not
adequately met by X.509 public key certificates. The most obvious example is
perhaps dynamic delegation, that is, the cession of a set of privileges by one
entity to another for a very specific period of time. It is true that this type
of delegation can be provided by other elements in the X.509 world, such as
attribute certificates [10], but their use is not convenient owing mainly to the
high degree of processing and the amount of time needed to generate them.
Identity certificates or public key X.509 certificates and Proxy Certificates
have the same format, as they both link a public key to a name or Subject Name,
which allows Proxy Certificates to be used easily by libraries and protocols with
no need for new implementations. However, unlike public key certificates, the
entity that generates the Proxy Certificate is not a Certification Authority (CA)
but rather an entity identified with a public key certificate or another Proxy
Certificate, which facilitates enormously the process of certificate generation and
makes the process of interacting with CAs superfluous.
All Proxy Certificates must contain a critical extension called PCI (Proxy
Certificate Information) which not only identifies the certificate as a Proxy Cer-
tificate but also enables the certificate generator to express its desires with re-
spect to the delegation of rights and to limit the number of Proxy Certificates
that can be generated on the basis of the same. For the former, the PCI extension
has a framework for the transport of delegation policies expressed in any policy
language, with the sole restriction that the parties must be able to interpret the
language and, hence, the policy defined.
The process to generate X.509 Proxy Certificate for delegation involves the
following steps:
1. The delegatee generates a pair of keys, a public and a private one.
2. The public key is used by the delegatee to form a Proxy Certificate request to
be sent to the delegator through an authenticated channel with an integrity
guarantee.
3. The delegator checks that the request is correct and, if all is in order, the
Proxy Certificate is generated. The certificate must be signed either with the
private key of the generator or the private key of another Proxy Certificate.
4. The delegator sends the Proxy Certificate generated to the delegatee through
an authenticated channel with an integrity guarantee.
It is evident that the process of generating Proxy Certificates is quicker and
easier than that of X.509 public key certificates. The main advantage is that the
process does not require the intervention of a CA.
3.2 SAML
This section provides a brief introduction to the SAML 2.0 [11], which is an
XML-based language used to exchange authentication and authorization infor-
mation between different entities in a network. SAML allows an entity to make
assertions of security information on a subject through use of statements. Hence,
an assertion linked to a subject may contain three different types of statements:
– Authentication statements: These indicate whether a user has been authen-
ticated or not. If authentication has been completed successfully, they must,
at least, indicate the method of authentication used and the specific time
the authentication took place.
– Authorization decision statements: This specifies what the subject is eligible
to do. It contains recommendations on access control, such as when a subject
can or cannot access a resource.
– Attribute statements: These contain a specific set of subject-related attributes.
For example, name, age and present employment.
The exchange of requests and responses of SAML assertions is performed with
different communication protocols by means of binding. The most common
method is to transport SAML messages over HTML, although SOAP is also
commonly used.
3.3 Integration of SAML Attribute Statements and Proxy
Certificates
One of the most important features of the architecture presented herein for
identity delegation in public institutions is the integration of SAML attribute
statements and X.509 Proxy Certificates. The idea emerged from study of the
GridShib project [12]. The objective of the project is to enable interoperabil-
ity between the Globus Toolkit® by Globus Alliance [13] and Shibboleth®
by Internet2 [14] to attain secure exchange of attributes between Grid virtual
organizations and institutions of higher education.
The GridShib project proposes an approach called X.509 binding for SAML
[15]. This is a way of embedding SAML assertions in X.509 certificates, whether
they are public key certificates or Proxy Certificates. It uses a non-critical ex-
tension of the X.509 v3 certificate, to which a single Object Identifier (OID) is
assigned, that may be defined in ASN.1 as a SEQUENCE of <saml:Assertion>.
In broad outline, every certificate can contain a non-critical extension that in
turn contains a SAML assertion or a reference to it. If it has not been gen-
erated by the same entity that signed the certificate, the assertion must have
been signed. If the entities match, the assertion signature is unnecessary, as the
certificate signature covers the extension and, hence, the assertion. Linking the
SAML assertions by means of a non-critical extension allows third parties to
override the extension and therefore, enable normal use of the certificate in any
environment.
This method of integrating SAML assertions in X.509 certificates, specifi-
cally in Proxy Certificates, constitutes one of the foundations for solving the
problem of delegation as conceived for the pan-European identity management
infrastructure proposed by the authors in the section that follows.
Specifically, the use of Proxy Certificates generated dynamically, exploiting
the capacities of extensions and integration with SAML, offers the advantage
of easy implementation of services with attribute-based delegation of identity
and authorization, providing a flexibility of use that had barely been considered
in previous architectures. Such flexibility has become a necessity owing to the
frequent role representatives or agents play in traditional methods.
4 Proposed Delegation Model
Below we present the architecture conceived for delegation and its mode of oper-
ation. The proposal begins from the starting point explained in Welch et al. [7],
which presents a system for dynamic identity delegation by using X.509 Proxy
Certificates in Grid environments, while adapting them to the use of Identity
Providers and Service Providers in an electronic Identity Management System
and integrating in X.509 certificates the part related to use of SAML attribute
assertions and their transport.
For the presentation of participating entities and of the model of communica-
tion and performance, we shall start from a hypothetical case of use by a person,
a German citizen for example, who seeks to obtain a service from an official in-
stitution but, for a number of reasons, is forced to delegate to a management
company, who will perform all administrative steps on his or her behalf.
At first, the participating entities would be as follows:
– Delegator: The person or entity that cedes part of his or her privileges to
another. In our example, it is a citizen who seeks to receive a service. In our
example, the German citizen.
– Delegatee: The person or entity that receives the privileges from the delega-
tor. In our example, the management company.
– Service Provider: The entity responsible for providing a certain service, either
to the delegatee or the delegator. If the service provider supports providing
services to delegatees, it must be capable of verifying that the delegation
process has been performed correctly.
– Identity Provider: The entity responsible for authenticating users and gen-
erate authentication or attribute assertions. In our example, it would be the
entity responsible for authenticating users in German public institutions.
The model of communication and interaction in providing a service with del-
egation is illustrated step-by-step in the figures below. The information flow
sequence is as follows:
Fig. 1. Model of service provision with delegation: authentication
The steps shown in 1 and 2 depict the interaction of a citizen delegator with
the Identity Provider and the initiation of communication with the delegatee.
Figure 3 shows the final model of service provision with delegation of identity
and revocation queries
1. The delegator presents his or her credentials to the Identity Provider with
intention of being authenticated. Said credentials may be, for example, an
Fig. 2. Model of service provision with delegation: delegation of identity
X.509 public key certificate such as one presently used in some European
Union countries. The delegator also requests a SAML assertion with an at-
tribute statement that includes attributes needed for provision of a service
through a delegatee.
2. The Identity Provider, after verifying the credentials of the delegator and
that everything is in order, provides a signed SAML assertion with the set
of attributes requested. It is the delegator’s task to check that the attributes
and the Identity Provider’s signature are correct.
(a) The delegator asks the delegatee to access the service in his or her name.
(b) The delegatee, with the intention of obtaining a token to authorize said
person to act as a delegatee vis-a-vis the service provider, generates a
pair of keys – a public key and a private one – and sends the delegator
the public key, while keeping the private key properly protected.
The Delegator shall build a Proxy Certificate for the key received, thus gener-
ating the delegation token. The Proxy Certificate will include, through a non-
critical extension and in a manner that is similar to that proposed in [15], the
SAML assertion with the attribute statement received from the Identity Provider
and signed by the latter. Thus, the Proxy Certificate will also include, through
a non-critical extension, identification of the service or services for which del-
egation is granted, so that the service provider can determine not only if the
delegator has delegated access to services but also the services to which access
has been delegated. To identify services, URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers)
[16] are used to achieve unequivocal identification. The use of URIs also pro-
vides another advantage, given their hierarchical structure: the delegator can
specify if the delegation applies to only one service or to a set of services with a
single provider .
3. The delegator sends the delegatee the Proxy Certificate generated.
4. Once the delegatee is in possession of the Proxy Certificate, it also has the
token that will allow it to request the service from the Service Provider.
The Service Provider checks the validity of the Proxy Certificate and verifies that
the validation path is correct. The Proxy Certificate is linked to the delegator
by the signature, so the Service Provider will know in whose name the delegatee
is acceding to the service. On this basis, and that of the SAML assertion with
the attribute statement and the URI of the allowed services included in the
pertinent extensions, the Service Provider can make decisions of authentication
and authorization that will enable it to determine whether to provide the service.
5. Assuming that everything is in order, the Service Provider delivers to the
delegatee information on service requested.
6. The delegatee then delivers to the delegator the results of the service.
As we can see, step 2 (Fig. 1) consists of a signature verification that involves
interaction of the delegator with the PKI to verify whether the certificate of
the Identity Provider has been revoked. In addition, after step 4, (Fig. 3) the
Proxy Certificate is verified. As defined in the RFC 3820 [9], a process must be
undertaken in such a way that to complete verification of this type of certificate
we must check, first of all, that the certificate of the entity generating it, in our
example the public key certificate of the delegator, is valid under the verifica-
tion procedures of PKI as defined in the RFC 3280 [17]. Moreover, for a Proxy
Certificate to be considered valid, the following must be carried out:
1. For all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the issuer of proxy
certificate x+1 and the subject distinguished name of certificate x+1 is a
legal subject distinguished name to have been issued by certificate x.
2. Certificate 1 is valid proxy certificate issued by the end entity certificate
whose information is given as input to the proxy certificate path validation
process.
3. Certificate n is the proxy certificate to be validated.
4. For all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time in question.
5. For all certificates in the path with a length constraint field, the number of
certificates in the path following that certificate does not exceed the length
specified in that field.
Nevertheless, and bearing in mind the above, there is still a problem with using
Proxy Certificates: no procedures have yet been defined for revoking this type of
certificates. There are applications in which, owing to the specific and restricted
use of these certificates, they are unnecessary. However, in our case, owing to
the numerous possible types of use, this type of mechanism is indispensable.
Thus, the architecture includes a new entity, a Proxy Certificate Revocation
Authority. Like Revocation Authorities in the present PKI, it maintains a listing
of certificates, specifically Proxy Certificates, that have been revoked.
In ADMISSION project we propose the use of Proxy Certificate Revocation
Authorities for each one of the national eIDMs to manage the status of the
Proxy Certificates that have been issued by the entities in it. Each of the Proxy
Certificate Revocation Authorities has a revocation list in which every issuer
of Proxy Certificates is associated to a list of certificate identifiers issued by
it that have been revoked. It would also enable querying and updating of the
list. Owing to its functionality, it has been decided that the Proxy Certificate
Revocation Authority will be included as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) in the
PKI infrastructure being used. tThe process of querying the revocation status
of the Proxy Certificate by the Service Provider is depicted as steps 4a and 4b,
yielding the final proposal for a communication model as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Model of service provision with delegation of identity and revocation queries
At present, the authors herein are working on the implementation of a pilot
project based on the proposed infrastructure for managing identity and provid-
ing services both with and without delegation of identity in the a City Council
in the region of Madrid, with a view to proving the viability of the solution and
its possibilities. The pilot project is being implemented in a real scenario at a
small scale, involving a circle of trust with several Service Providers (SPs) and
an Identity Provider. We have selected a number of telematic services that the
city council will soon offer on the Internet: applications for tax rebates and ex-
emptions, applications for authorizations (such as permits to set up a newsagent,
pavement cafes, bars in the public highway, to allow use of cranes, etc) and appli-
cations for operating licenses. Each of these services is offered through a different
Service Provider that can process demands from citizens and delegatees, but all
within the same circle of trust. To enable access to these services, identifica-
tion of citizens is to be performed with an X.509 digital certificate embedded in
their National Identity Card (eID Card) or another digital certificate issued by a
Certification Authority accepted for transactions in national public institutions.
Verification of citizens’ identity is performed by the Identity Provider of that
circle of trust.
We are now capturing the attribute requirements necessary for citizens to
access services and defining SAML assertions with attribute statements on this
basis. Simultaneously, we are working on the implementation of identity dele-
gation in the same testing environment with a view to achieving a complete
identity management solution with support for delegation.
5 Scalability and Applicability of the Proposed Solution
at a pan-European Level
Nowadays, Europeans are living in an environment that is not only increasingly
digitalized, but which is increasingly globalized. A citizen of France can work for
a German company and perform his or her work in Belgium and do so problem-
free, in theory; such a person must be able to interact with the company and with
different public administrations online. This global environment leads to a series
of problems that arise when we ask questions like the following: How could a per-
son with a French electronic identification card access online services provided by
German public administration? And what about the person’s employment data
as a worker in Belgium? Further, how can German public institutions manage
the identity data of the French national?
5.1 Problems of Interoperability
Answers to the questions posed above are no simple matter. On the basis of
action plans launched by the European Union, in recent years a number of ini-
tiatives have focused on achieving pan-European interoperability between iden-
tity management systems established in each European Union country. Although
most of these initiatives are nothing more than theoretical proposals that solve
some problems without providing a comprehensive solution, some do go further
and propose architectures that are now in the pilot stage.
One of the first studies or projects related to interoperability of identity
management systems was the Modinis eIDM Study [18], which studied the use
of electronic identity management systems in the European Union and analyzed
the most significant consequences of using these eIDM systems.
Another interesting system is the TLS-Federation [19]. This project aimed at
providing a regulatory and interoperable working framework for identity man-
agement at a pan-European level. It focused on employing technologies and
standards that were sufficiently well-known and on protecting of the user side
against possible scenarios of identity theft.
The GUIDE project (Creating a European Identity Management Architecture
for eGovernment) [20] sought to develop a model for identity interoperability
within the European Union, so as to enable Member States to trust the iden-
tity of an entity – whether individuals or companies – in another State. The
underlying concept involves a federated network of identity management that
requires membership in circles of trust based on operational agreements, thus
yielding a federation of service providers and identity providers. The objective of
GUIDE was to define an architecture to enable the joining of these federations
into a large circle of trust with a view to creating a single identity environment
throughout the European Union.
Another proposal for a pan-European identity management system is STORK
(Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed) [21]. This recently-begun project seeks
to develop and test common specifications for mutual and secure recognition
of national electronic identities (eID) of participating countries. Their specific
objectives include defining common models and specifications for the mutual
recognition of eIDs between countries, verifying in a real environment easy and
secure eID solutions to be used by individuals and companies and achieving co-
ordination with other initiatives of the European Union in order to maximize
the usefulness of eID services.
As part of the research project ADMISSION, we have analyzed the problem
of identity management at all levels of public institutions, from the local level to
Europe as a whole. After a detailed study of identity management at the local,
regional, provincial and national levels, we reached the conclusion that problems
of interoperability that exist between the member countries of the European
Union in managing citizens’ identities are also found in the interaction between
different levels of institutions, even within a single country. We propose herein a
model of interoperability that may be applied not only at a pan-European level,
but also at lower levels, i.e., nationally, regionally or locally. It would guarantee
interoperability in identity management at all levels. The model builds on the
beneficial features identified in the identity management systems discussed herein
and solves the problems detected in them.
Federation, achieved by establishing circles of trust at each level and between
levels, as shown in Fig. 4, is the basis of the proposed system.
Fig. 4. Infrastructure proposed in ADMISSION project
The chart shows how each level of government – local, regional and national
– has a circle of trust that links together one or more Identity Providers (IdP)
and Service Providers (SP) at that level. To attain reliable authentication of in-
dividuals, it will use token mapping: that is, it will allow for maintaining present
systems and map currently used authentication elements to common elements
in order to guarantee interoperability of services. This is a fundamental princi-
ple, as the deployment of services offered by public institutions has grown in an
uncoordinated fashion for quite some time, and they often provide services that
are highly valued by citizens. Thus, the system uses the concept of proxy as an
interface between identity management systems to ensure interoperability both
at the same level – for instance, local interoperability between two or more city
councils – and between levels; for example, between a city council and a hierar-
chically higher level: a provincial, regional or national institution. Exchange of
authentication tokens will use X.509 certificates, the use of which is familiar to
all official institutions.
5.2 Problems of Electronic Signatures
In addition to the problems of interoperability between different identity man-
agement systems discussed above, there are other interoperability problems that
have a greater impact for because they are directly related to our delegation
solution, namely electronic signatures. The ultimate interoperability situation
for e-signatures and any other use of eIDs can be stated as:
– An eID holder shall be able to use the eID to sign a piece of information
towards any counterpart, even internationally. The eID holder independently
selects the eID to use.
– The receiver (relying party) of a signed document shall be able to accept
signatures from all counterparts, regardless of the eID used by the counter-
part.
– A third party, receiving a document signed by other parties, shall be able to
verify the signatures no matter the eIDs used by the other parties.
The relaying party role is clearly the one facing the complexity. The eID holder
has one trusted party to rely on: the Certification Authority (CA). The relaying
party must check all signatures, handling the relevant signature formats (includig
all necessary modes) for multiple signatures, all necessary hash and crypto algo-
rithms and the eIDs of all signers. Although the technical validation of signatures
has its challenges with respect to scaling, the real problem to the relaying party
is the assessment of the risk implied by accepting the signature, determined by
the legal situation, the quality of the cryptography used, the liability situation,
and the trustworthiness of the CA. With the objective of solving these problems,
the European project PEPPOL [22] is developing guidelines, specifications and
pilot solutions to overcome the lack of interoperability between national schemes
for electronically signing tender documents.
5.3 Explanation of Scalability
As is clear from the foregoing, the possible use of our delegation solution in a
pan-European scenario is not a simple matter, as things stand today. Never-
theless, we can say that the solution proposed to interoperability problems in
identity management is following the same trends as other European initiatives
undertaken to date. This solution fits perfectly into our interoperability proposal
and, therefore, allows for setting up a model of identity delegation that can be
used at a pan-European level. As we have mentioned, the interoperability model
is based on the establishment of circles of trust at different levels of public ad-
ministrations in each country and between all countries. As X.509 certificates
present in the citizen identity cards are usually applicable at all levels of admin-
istration, it would be no problem to generate delegation at one level – whether
local, regional or national – or between levels in one country. The main problem
may arise in relation to revoking Proxy Certificates of the delegation, but as
proposed above, inclusion of the Proxy Certificate Revocation Authority as a
Trusted Third Party in the national PKI infrastructure provides a solution.
A different problem arises if one wishes to establish our model at a pan-
European level: that is, we wish to set up an identity delegation system that
would work between citizens and institutions of different countries. The main
drawback lies in the above-mentioned problem of interoperability of electronic
signatures, given that our delegation solution is based on the generation of Proxy
Certificates that, as we have seen are directly signed by the delegator. A dele-
gatee or a Service Provider in a country other than that of the delegator would
find it difficult to verify the Proxy Certificate used in the delegation. Never-
theless, it would seem clear that the work and interest shown by the European
Union in initiatives and action plans like the i2010 eGovernment Action Plan
[23] in achieving total interoperability and a more global environment in Euro-
pean public administration obliges us to assume that total interoperability will
be in place in the medium term for Europe-wide electronic signatures, thus mak-
ing our delegation fully viable. Figure 5 shows a diagram of the pan-European
global interoperability solution to support identity delegation, assuming that
interoperability of electronic signatures has been attained.
Fig. 5. Global infrastructure for interoperability and identity delegation
As we can see, two national environments and a pan-European environment
are depicted, each with their IdP and SP and linked together through proxies
that enable pan-European interoperability in identity management. Further, the
PKI is depicted in each of the national environments through the Certification
Authority (CA), and their communication with the Proxy Certificate Revoca-
tion Authority (PCRA), as required in our delegation solution given that no
pan-European PKI exists, we have assigned the national PKIs the same level
and assumed a relation of trust between them. With a view to enabling the
architecture to accommodate countries that lack their own PKI, the diagram
depicts, also at the same level, a CA with its own PCRA at the pan-European
level, thereby facilitating the addition of new countries.
6 Conclusions
The solutions to identity management problems in international environments
will undoubtedly facilitate citizens’ access to services in an ever more globalized
world, while opening the door to ever more sophisticated and secure telematic
services. With this in mind, the EU has set in motion a number of initiatives to
develop and implement a pan-European identity management infrastructure. It
is committed to solutions that will not force modifications in the national digital
identification systems as developed by each country in accordance with its own
needs and laws. But such solutions must be sufficiently reliable and robust to
win acceptance in every country of Europe.
Although the range of solutions available is broad, important issues remain to
be solved in most of them, such as the lack of integration with the private sector,
the absence of single data sources to ensure the uniqueness and coherence of
information on entities, the lack of solutions for identity delegation and problems
related to the use of certain standards.
Therefore, the project undertaken by the authors’ research group is oriented
towards seeking solutions to these problems at two distinct levels. First, the so-
lutions should have an echo in Europe; thus, we are in regular contact with the
leading groups working in this field. Second, we are seeking to extrapolate our
solutions to our national public institutions, where problems of interoperability
between identity management systems at different institutional levels are sim-
ilar to those in Europe. Consequently, we aim to make contributions that can
support progress towards total interoperability in identity management both at
national and pan-European levels to enable provision of services in a way that is
simple and fully transparent to users. To address one of the main inadequacies
of identity management systems proposed to date, our model integrates in the
Global infrastructure for interoperability a solution for dynamic identity dele-
gation based on X.509 Proxy Certificates and SAML assertions with attribute
statements, thus yielding a pan-European identity management infrastructure
with support for identity delegation.
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